Archive for November, 2011 | Monthly archive page

The Commonwealth Banks behaviour court out

Friday, November 25th, 2011

Report : Ron Burgandy

Content : CBA Board of Drectors, Storm Financial advisors, Juctice Greenwood, Emmanuel Cassimatis, CGI margin call notices

Friday, 25th November 2011

On the 4th Dec 08 the tables were turned on the Commonwealth Bank when a meeting between the bank and Storm was recorded by Storm. The CBA's claim that Cassimatis ordered the banks unauthorised sell-down of Storm client asset was exposed as a fabrication.

Following on from previous articles in relation to the letter dated 15 Aug 2008 sent by the Commission against Bank Atrocities to the CBA Board, page 9 of the Commissions letter seems to confirm the assertion by Mr Emmanuel Cassimatis claiming that the CBA set Storm up as a fall guy to protect its own position and cover its own mistakes. The CBA has held the line all along that Storm was responsible for issuing margin calls (which has now been disproved). After interviewing numerous Storm staff and advisors and interrogating Storm records (provided by a source from the receivers), The Plain Truth can confirm that Storm during the entire time that it operated had never issued a margin call notice, had no agreement in its records that it was required to issue margin call notices, and most importantly did not have any authority or the ability to do so. Statements by the CBA alleging that Storm was responsible for issuing margin call notices were unable to be substantiated by any documentation from CBA such as contracts, memorandums of understanding or emails. Clearly advisors of any dealer group, not just Storm, have never been the responsible parties for issuing margin call notices or managing the actual margin loans. What is consistent with all bank loans is that each bank is responsible for the management of their own products. It is inconceivable that a bank would confer to a third party the right to lend the banks money at the third parties discretion and then lose it for them. This view was reinforced by Justice Greenwood in his determination in the Federal Court on 24 Dec 2008 (relevant extract below).

By early Dec 08 the CBA had already determined to lay blame at the feet of Storm for mistakes and deliberate wrongdoings made by the CBA. The CBA was already a long way down the track in its preparation to be rid of Storm and Storm clients in order to reinforce the appearance that they [CBA] were above dealing with people like that. Their phony story was going to be that Storm was responsible for issuing margin call notices and making margin call decisions. The meeting between 3 Storm executives and approximately 8 CBA executives and managers on the 4th December 2008 seemed like a good place for CBA to ambush Storm, given there were more than double the number of CBA witnesses compared to Storm witnesses at that meeting. In a single strike the CBA hoped to give legitimacy to selling down numerous Storm clients without authority by giving the impression that Storm, through its CEO Mr Cassimatis, gave the instruction. So confident were they in their arrogance that when the CBA wrote to clients on the 9th Dec 08 informing them that the principles of Storm had given the instruction to sell clients down they went overboard implying that the instruction from Mr Cassimatis was unambiguous and asserting that the instruction was  clear'. Not only was this instruction not clear, there was no such instruction. This manoeuvre by the CBA also enabled them to establish the line that  Storm was fully responsible for their client's negative position'. Where CBA came unstuck was that by the 4th Dec 08, Mr Cassimatis had smelt a rat and taped the entire meeting which lasted many hours. In addition to this the CBA logic didn't stand up. Let's play devil's advocate for a moment and assume that Storm was in fact the sole manager of the margin loan and fully responsible as CBA claims and that Storm had the ability to make the decisions on when to sell out clients as evidenced by CBA's assertion on the 4 Dec 08 meeting,  â€¦we received clear instruction…'. The question that then needs to be answered is, why would Storm sell down its clients, its advisors, itself and the Cassimatises when they were in negative equity? Surely someone who holds their destiny in their own hands would not take such a destructive action. The argument from CBA, that Storm cut its own throat, makes no sense. Justice Greenwoods findings, that Storm had proved to the standard required at such proceedings, that CBA was misleading and deceptive, backs up that the CBA lied. One thing is for certain, had Storm not got the Commonwealth Bank into court in Dec 08 and raised the alarm, the CBA would have easily got away with perpetrating one of the biggest frauds in Australia’s history with the world believing that Storm was the responsible culprit. To the detriment of Storm clients the CBA 3 years later is still perilously close to substantially getting away with its crime.

The Plain Truth is asking that any ex Storm clients who were either orally told by the CBA or informed in writing that Storm was responsible for issuing margin call notices to pass on copies of this evidence to The Plain Truth. Those who were informed orally over the phone, please write a statement and forward it to The Plain Truth either via the  contact us' tab on our website or to the postal address.

The Editor
The Plain Truth,
PO Box 2783

New Farm QLD 4005

Content : CBA Board of Drectors, Storm Financial advisors, Juctice Greenwood, Emmanuel Cassimatis.

Greg Medcraft – Head of ASIC runs with the hares and hunts with the hounds.

Tuesday, November 22nd, 2011

Report : Ted Baxter

Content : ASIC Greg Medcraft, Australian Securitisation Forum, Societe Generale, recent GFC news.

Tuesday, 22nd November 2011

In a tragic twist of fate the banking industry manages to insert as the head of ASIC a dyed the in wool 30 year merchant banker who was active in the origination, structuring, distribution and investment in securities backed by among other things residential mortgages ' the very instruments that led to the sub-prime crisis and consequent Global Financial Crisis.

Hi all. It's Teddy again (by the way that's not my real name). It wasn't my turn to post something today but I begged my editor to let me jump the queue and he did, bless his soul. I just couldn't help myself. I am so angry knowing about ASIC's boss, Medcraft.

Before we expose him it's important to give you background on the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its origin and for this I apologise in advance. From this background I hope I can get the message across to you because I am not a writer by profession and I've been thrown in at the deep end with only my economics background to draw on.

Background of the Sub-Prime crisis and GFC

a) The goldilocks economy era of the Clinton / Greenspan duo was going gangbusters, but relying on the home construction industry economic growth engine. This was the case around the world not just in the U.S.

b) This home construction growth engine began to saturate as those who could afford to buy property, did buy property and in many cases 2nd and 3rd properties.

c) As the buyers who could afford to purchase these property assets got used up it became obvious to the banking industry that their circular lending would grind to a halt.

d) Should this slowdown eventuate then the major players would be out of the money. The bankers who needed the growth in their loan books would lose their bonuses if growth declined, the developers who built all these homes that couldn't be occupied due to oversupply would lose their profits, be forced out of business or go broke and of course the sales people who marketed and sold these sub-prime assets would be left with severely diminished incomes or out of a job.

e) In the United States the bankers, developers and sales people got together and hatched a plan to keep things on the boil. This plan required creating additional demand or even a new source of demand to keep soaking up the oversupply allowing them to continue expanding the housing stock.

f) The additional demand was created by lobbying governments and putting the wind up these governments about economic slowdown and job losses. As the pending slowdown became obvious to the various treasuries and central banks in the western world these governments elected to stimulate an already oversupplied housing market with home buyer grants and tax breaks. This even happened in Australia with Prime Minister Howard's election winning first home-owners grant stimulus package which has continued in one form or another to this day.

g) When the engorged additional demand was fully utilised the bankers, developers and sales people had to find a market which didn't exist forcing them to create new one. These smart greedy men were able to find a crack in American legislation enabling them to create a whole new group of  housing investors'. Their logic was brilliantly nefarious. They reasoned that there were only 2 types of buyers for property. Those who could afford to purchase and those who couldn't. Those who could were all used up, that left only those who couldn't afford to purchase a property. All that remained was to find a way to get those who couldn't afford to buy property to in fact buy property.

h) The obstacles needed to be overcome to achieve this were few and easy to solve.

The first problem was to convince poor people that they should buy and overcome the concern of affordability. This was done by a smart sales person saying,  you know property, it's safe and it always goes up and it will cost you nothing, you can borrow the lot including the costs. So if you buy, let it go up, sell, then take the profit. Easy money!'  But what happens if things go wrong and I'm stuck with the property valued less than what I owe?' the canny potential investor asks.  Ha, you can't lose' comes the reply,  you live in a non-judicial foreclosure state where effectively you can just hand the key in, walk away and not be responsible for any negative equity.'  Sounds great. I'll take one of those.' says the now gullible investor.

The second problem, once the sale is made is to actually get the guy finance to buy the place. The sales person approaches a mortgage originator enthusiastically declaring  I've got a sale and you can lend some more money!' The bank replies,  we need the figures for my bonus but this guy is too risky, he can't afford it.' The sales guy replies,  no problem, you can just securitize these risky loans backed by sub-prime mortgages, turn them into an asset in their own right and sell them off to other investors such as banks around the world who can on-sell them (for a good commission) to unsuspecting investors for us. You can even sell these sub-prime assets to local authorities, churches, councils, charities, hospitals, nursing homes, retirement villages, listed public companies, universities, superannuation funds etc in Australia. Tell you what, to make it easy we'll use Lehman Brothers to push the stuff and pay Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investor Services a fee to give them a AA or AAA credit rating. This way everyone will trust the thing'.

The ability to keep demand in equilibrium with supply required house prices to continue increasing. As one of my sources so eloquently put it in late 2007:

“Not only did prices not increase at the required rate or even flatten, but actually the worst occurred. US housing prices declined. The consequence of this asset value decline was that the  house of cards' began to crumble. The original sub-prime borrowers, who were the driving force underpinning the assets, began to default on their loan repayments. This meant that the income stream of the asset dried up rendering the asset less valuable. Consequently the value of the original loans to the banks declined to the extent that nobody wanted them. Therefore this securitised asset could not be valued or traded by the market and became illiquid. Effectively the owners i.e. the secondary investors who bought these securitised assets went into  margin call'.  Although all the houses that underpinned these securities are in the US, the effect of Globalisation ensured that the ownership of these assets was far and wide. Even some council's within Australia were caught out. Clearly globalisation has allowed this virus to spread beyond the borders within which it originated. The virus of illiquidity required the vaccine of injected money. The financial health authorities, who are the world's central banks led by the US Federal Reserve, stepped in. The spread of the financial virus appears to have been contained with the strengthening of international banking balance sheets through the injection of liquidity-producing cash from various central banks”.

The above characterisation is pretty accurate about what happened re the sub-prime GFC with the exception of the view that the world's central banks had contained the problem. As we now know the financial cancer of the GFC is not in remission and is continuing to spread unabated, especially to Europe.

Now to the guts of my story and I apologise for the necessary lengthy pre-amble. It might surprise you to know that our ol' mate Greg Medcraft (he's not really anyone's mate), the current and newly appointed head of ASIC, is a wolf turned shepherd. A quick look into his background revealed the following:-

– He has had a long history working across global securitisation markets, the very markets that led to the sub-prime and Global Financial Crisis.

– In April 2008 whilst CBA victims / Storm clients were being groomed for disaster, Greg Medcraft was appointed executive director of the Australian Securitisation Forum.

РPrior to April 2008 he was managing director and global head of securitisation at Soci̩t̩ G̩n̩rale Corporate and Investment Banking in New York where he led a group of 110 specialists who were active in the origination, structuring, distribution, and investment in securities backed by commercial assets, for example trade receivables, commercial mortgages, corporate and small business loans, equipment leases AND consumer assets such as credit cards, student loans and residential mortgages (the stuff that sub-prime assets were made of). By the end of his tenure with Soci̩t̩ G̩n̩rale, the group was managing US$35 billion of asset backed investments.

РIn total Medcraft has spent 30 years in various positions around the world with Soci̩t̩ G̩n̩rale including America, Asia, Europe and Australia developing and distributing (selling) various securitised assets including and especially mortgage backed securities in America.

– According to ASIC's website, in 2002 he co-founded the American Securitization Forum and was its chairman between 2005 and 2007. What ASIC fails to disclose (and ASIC is always going on about adequate disclosure) is that Medcraft was involved in ALL aspects of the securitisation industry in the period when the sub-prime securities were originated, manufactured and distributed. ASIC goes on to describe in a very innocuous and innocent sounding way, the American Forum as an industry group representing 350 member institutions comprising all major stakeholders in the US$1 trillion US securitisation market. Again what ASIC fails to disclose (and ASIC is always going on about adequate disclosure) is that Medcraft's forum represented and he had a relationship with ALL of the manufacturers of sub-prime assets, including Lehman Brothers.

Scroll forward to 2009 after the sub-prime crisis was fully blown and what have we got…Mr Greg Medcraft getting himself appointed to the police force tasked with overseeing the activities of his previous 30 years in merchant banking and securitisation of mortgage-backed securities. Is there a better place for the hare to hide than to hunt with the hounds?

I can only shake my head in dismay and ask myself how can this state of affairs possibly occur in this country were ANZAC's have died and are still dying to protect our freedoms and sense of fair play. How on earth did the banking industry manage to have appointed as head of ASIC one of their own? What chance is there that ASIC will ever genuinely chase the big banks now that they have their hands not just on all the money but also are now able to make and control the rules? Is this the ultimate form of corruption? Here is a man who has shown his colours with his statement, “Our market is operating fairly and efficiently”. By what measure is this man claiming that the market is operating fairly? If a general vote could be taken then the outcome would show – there is no fairness in the market. I suppose I must concede that the market, though unfair to the many, is highly efficient at sucking the small investor dry and taking care of its own. In the immortalised words of one of our resident experts Basil Fawlty…“This is exactly how Nazi Germany started”.

Mr Medcraft, your DNA is your DNA and you cannot change. Your cunning to become head of the police force giving yourself immunity and being in a position to never investigate yourself or catch yourself for any wrongdoing is to be applauded. But here at The Plain Truth we have a job to do and that is to protect the honest, hard working small investors who trusted the banks with their life savings. Accordingly we must insist that you vacate your position as head of ASIC and hand over the reins to someone who cares and or who has been on the receiving end of men such as you. With your DNA how can bank victims and especially former Storm client expect you to fight the good fight against the CBA and an industry in which you learnt and thrived for more than 30 years? Sadly I think the only answer to this question is that you cannot.

The Plain Truth is urgently in need of volunteer copywriters, proof-readers and investigators. Copy material and lines of investigation will be provided by The Plain Truth. Anyone who is able to assist in any of these areas please contact:

The Editor
The Plain Truth,
PO Box 2783

New Farm QLD 4005

Till we meet again,

Content : ASIC Greg Medcraft, Australian Securitisation Forum, Societe Generale

ASIC attacks banks ' or does it?

Friday, November 18th, 2011

Report : Ted Baxter

Content : ASIC court proceedings, Unregistered Managed Investment Scheme (UMIS), Storm Financial Prospectus, CBA Ralph Norris email, Tony D’Aloisio contact, Hugh Copley email.

Friday, 18th November 2011

ASIC handles the CBA with kid gloves in its Federal Court proceedings. ASIC refuses to proceed against the CBA for breach of contract, unconscionable conduct and misleading & deceptive which was already in the Federal Court pipeline.

On Wednesday 22nd December 2010, ASIC confirmed that it had lodged legal proceedings that ASIC had announced on Friday 26th November 2010 in relation to the collapse of Storm.

Following the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars by ASIC, 2 years of investigations that started 12 Dec 08 and enquiries before that time, this is the best that ASIC can come up with for the thousands of CBA victims.

Our analysis of the lodged proceedings against the banks has been tabulated below to show the effects on each bank.

What the above table is indicating is that ASIC is only proceeding against the CBA on 1 count out of the 4 whilst proceeding on all 4 counts against the Bank of Queensland (the least culpable) and Macquarie Bank. I must say after having looked at the evidence The Plain Truth has amassed about this issue, I am so gobsmacked that I'm finding it difficult to right [sic] this article. There is no doubt what-so-ever in my mind that ASIC is covering for the CBA. This cover-up by ASIC commenced with the gagging of Storm, which ASIC still denies, further directions from ASIC gagging the Cassimatis' and ASICs deliberate avoidance of asking the relevant questions which would have opened lines of investigation leading to individuals within the CBA. Our keystone cops within ASIC could not be more obvious.

According to ASIC, CBA has:-

• Not breached any contract (ASIC is probably right, the CBA hasn't breached any contract ' it's materially breached EVERY Storm contract).

• Has not conducted itself in an unconscionable way (rather has been honourable and proper)

• Carried no liability as linked credit provider of Storm. It appears ASIC has missed the fact that CBA was the only credit provider of Storm including Storm's own margin loan; and had MARGIN loans, BUSINESS loans, HOME loans and PERSONAL loans with Storm clients.

• Now started to appear that  CBA has done no wrong'.

And if you believe that, then you probably believe that the banks had nothing to do with the sub-prime crisis which led to the global financial crisis.

What about the fact that the CBA was the only bank in the group to have the dubious accolade of having a Federal Court ruling suggesting that it should be prosecuted for Misleading or Deceptive Conduct? The Plain Truth believes on advice and after having reviewed the evidence that such a prosecution would succeed.  The Plain Truth also believes that it is because of this prospect of success against the CBA that ASIC has declined to pursue this line.

So how can ASIC give the appearance of trying to ”prosecute” CBA whilst at the same time in reality shielding CBA? Very easily!

As you can see ASIC is able to shield the CBA by not instituting proceedings against it which may actually succeed in a court of law, but rather by chasing the CBA for something it knows has an extremely high probability of failing. By doing this ASIC gives the impression that it is actually chasing the CBA when it is not. In addition by also encouraging a plaintiff lawyer to pursue the same line, ASIC is reaping the benefit of not standing alone thus giving itself a mask of credibility. The Plain Truth investigators have received extensive advice that the  unregistered managed investment scheme' red herring is likely to fail. What is required for the unregistered managed investment scheme case brought by ASIC and another plaintiff lawyer to succeed is that the Storm badged managed funds needed to have been closed to the public in general and be only available to Storm clients.

The facts are quite clear.

1) ALL funds recommended and used by Storm in its advice were registered ' as stated in the funds PDS.

2) The CBA confirmed that the Storm badged funds were generic and able to be used by others confirmed in the following extract from the Parliamentary Inquiry transcript dated Wed, 28 Oct 09 ' CFS 38.

3) The particular funds that were  Storm badged' were registered and available to the general public. The evidence supporting this could be seen on the Storm website where the PDS's were made available for public subscription.

In summary we believe ASIC's objective here is to have CBA avoid all successful litigation in order to cleanse the CBA of official wrong doing giving the CBA relief from the statement made by its CEO Ralph Norris where he said on the 17 June 2009, “Our customers can be assured that where we have done wrong, we will put right. I am committed to the identification and resolution of all issues relating to the banks involvement with Storm Financial”.

Should the CBA not be successfully shielded by ASIC then the compensation pay out for their  real' wrongdoing would be in the many billions of dollars.

C'mon fellas in ASIC, some of you must be able to do the right thing. Forget about the airy fairy unregistered managed investment scheme and direct your energises to the real issues – breach of contract and misleading & deceptive conduct.

I must confess I wrote the previous paragraph tongue in cheek because the chance of ASIC moving in the right direction when the banking industry has managed to insert as it's newly appointed head, Greg Medcraft. Greg was not only a former banker but has a long history of working across global securitisation markets some of which led to the sub-prime crisis. But a lot more about Mr Medcraft in a later article.

For those of you interested in holding ASIC to account here are some contacts.

If you don't know what to ask just ask if ASIC prevented Storm from engaging with clients in late 08.

If ASIC answers 'yes' then the truth will finally begin to emerge. I don't think they'll say yes.

If ASIC answers  no' again then they have again shot themselves in the foot. You will see why in future articles. I think some may foolishly answer no.

If ASIC refuses to answer or gives waffle, then you know they are being deceptive. I predict this to be their likely response. Remember the answer can ONLY be either  yes' or  no'. There is no legal reason why they can't give you an answer and don't fall for the old,  there is still an investigation in progress' spiel.

*It may be worth noting that the Brisbane office of ASIC is located within the Commonwealth Building in Queen Street.

I have been asked by our editor to ask you for further evidence. Please forward to:

The Editor
The Plain Truth,
PO Box 2783

New Farm QLD 4005

We ask that information provided to The Plain Truth must be evidence and factual in nature. The Plain Truth is NOT INTERESTED IN OPINIONS. Unfortunately to date there have been too many ill-informed opinions flying around getting in the way of the truth and diluting the efforts of the people  actually' trying to make a difference. We need you to volunteer.

Till we meet again,

Content : ASIC court proceedings, Unregistered Managed Investment Scheme (UMIS), Storm Financial Prospectus, CBA Ralph Norris email, Tony D’Aloisio contact, Hugh Copley email.


2010.12.22 a ASIC has commenced Storm legal proceedings

2010.11.26 a ASIC announces intention to commence legal action

2008.12.31.2 Court summary of Judgement

Ian Narev's Half-Truths unravel as Full Truth emerges.

Tuesday, November 15th, 2011

Report : Ron Burgandy

Tuesday 15th November 2011

Contents : CBA CEO Ian Narev, Storm Financial, CGI margin lending

The continuing delivery of half-truth statements under oath again pulls the wool over the Parliamentary Committees eyes.

The Plain Truth has no doubt that Mr Ian Narev, the future CEO of the Commonwealth Bank, is an extremely smart man of many talents. Mr Narev has multiple law degree's, won the University of Auckland's prestigious senior prize in law and was awarded a scholarship to Cambridge. He was the top graduate in his Masters of Law degree class, has also obtained a Masters degree from New York University and an advanced degree from the University of Half-Truths (UHT). Mr Narev will need all the leadership skills he learnt at school on an Israeli kibbutz if he is to successfully and ethically complete putting right what his pending predecessor had done (and is probably still doing) wrong although on his current form Mr Narev isn't looking promising.

Today's release of pages 6, 7 & 8 of the letter sent by the Commission against Bank Atrocities to the CBA Board on 15 Aug 2008 further focus on the mistakes by the Commonwealth Bank and the crafty responses from Messers Narev, Cohen and co.

Pages 6 & 7 explain how Colonial Geared Investments (CGI's) Empire margin loan management system could not possibly handle multiple definition contracts with different methodologies for calculating the point at which a margin call should be triggered. Given the CBA was and remains unable to explain away its margin loan systemic deficiencies without admitting it simply got it all wrong, the bank chose to adopt the position that all the bad consequences to Storm clients of the Empire system deficiencies should be blamed on someone else.

This brings us to page 7 of the letter ' enter stage left Mr Narev…don't address the system deficiencies, just tell the world that “we” the CBA sent Storm 3 files a day and paint a picture that “we” the CBA gave Storm all the information to enable it to make margin calls that “we” the CBA should have made. That inaccurate perception should divert the magnifying glass away from “us” the CBA. I mean after all, it is highly unlikely that the world would question us and ask to actually test the integrity of the data we sent.

Whilst Mr Narev contends that the  3 files a day sent to Storm were for the purpose of issuing margin calls', The Plain Truth has uncovered the following:-

– Industry standard is that ONLY margin lenders can issue margin call notices, maintain margin loan account records and issue statements among other things.

– Samples of file notes viewed from the Storm database, which was provided to The Plain Truth by a source in the receivers offices, clearly show that the CBA's  margin call response work' allegedly performed by Storm was in fact buffer work aimed at preventing the possibility of margin calls. This is further supported by the 8 Oct Storm letter to clients.

– Contributing to overall deficient data, the “market values of securities were not updated by CGI in a timely manner resulting in information being delayed or not correctly available on the day it was required”. This was important particularly in the cases where clients were nearing margin call and made it difficult if not impossible for a client to make an informed decision. The table below illustrates this deficiency.

Finally when all is said and done Mr Narev, the above statements matter little because the data sent to Storm by your company was “profoundly defective”. This fact coupled with the non-issuance of margin call notices from CGI (to Storm clients) meant that the Commonwealth Banks destruction of Storm clients was inevitable. Please Mr Narev stop the half-truths and tell the full story. Three files a day you said were sent to Storm, on the surface seems to cover your position.  However your story comes apart when the truth, which you conveniently omitted to mention, about how defective the data was, emerges.

The Plain Truth is urgently in need of volunteer copywriters, proof-readers and investigators. Copy material and lines of investigation will be provided by The Plain Truth. Anyone who is able to assist in any of these areas please contact:

The Editor
The Plain Truth,
PO Box 2783
New Farm QLD 4005


2011.08.15 Letter to CBA board – David Turner (Pt 4)

2008.10.08 d Storm Switch letter 100% – client x

Commonwealth Bank CEO in waiting graduates from the school of half-truths.

Friday, November 11th, 2011

Report : Ron Burgandy

Wednesday 11th November 2011

Contents : CBA Ian Narev, CBA Board of directors, CBA Edward Tait

The Plain Truth wishes to congratulate Mr Ian Narev for graduating with high distinction from the University of Half-Truths (UHT).

The Plain Truth understands that Mr Narev (pictured on Mr Norris' right at the Parliamentary Inquiry) has completed his thesis and is half way through his PhD in half-truths. His skilful use of half-truths to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services has put Mr Narev to the top of his class deserving of a knighthood and trumping Mr Norris who after all has no formal tertiary qualifications what-so-ever.

On a more serious note The Plain Truth is today releasing page 5 of the letter sent by the Commission against Bank Atrocities to the CBA Board on 15 Aug 2008 together with any supporting data.

From an actual email that was sent by Mr Julie Cassimatis from Storm to the CBA…

…Mr Narev in testimony to the Parliamentary Joint Committee and who is to be the next CEO of the Commonwealth Bank, was deftly able to weave the following deceptions:-

1) With the simple use of the letter  s' after the word  email' ' “in emails to us” ' Mr Narev created an impression of multiple communications, when in fact he was referring to only one email.

2) With the words ' “we are happy to show them to the committee if that would help” ' Mr Narev was able to bluff his way through by leveraging off the trust that is implicit in such an obvious offer to show one's hand.

3) With the word  them' ' “…happy to show them to the committee…” ' Mr Narev was able to reinforce the impression that there were indeed lots of emails.

4) A source, who must remain unnamed, has informed The Plain Truth that Mr Narev was also encouraged to rely on the fact the Parliamentary Committee had so much evidence to process that it was likely his statements would be trusted and therefore the Committee was unlikely to request to sight the so-called emails. The same source also informed The Plain Truth that Bernie Ripoll who chaired the Parliamentary Joint Committee was also the chairman of the committee responsible for the oversight of ASIC and accordingly, for as yet undisclosed reasons, he was unlikely to probe too deeply. The Plain Truth is waiting on more evidence and information about Mr Ripoll's involvement and can report at this time that the evidence seen to date by The Plain Truth is not looking favourable for Mr Ripoll.  The Plain Truth intends to publish evidence and a full article on Mr Ripoll's activities in the future.

5) Mr Narev was able to convert – “do not start phoning clients” to “not to contact clients directly”. The subtle difference in this case is that  phoning' is single very specific subset of the idea of contact where as  contact' is its own universal set whose broad meaning encompasses all forms of communication (i.e. mail, email, face to face, phone, video, through 3rd party etc etc). By using this subtly Mr Narev created the impression that Strom directed the CBA to stay away from Storm clients.

6) The words in the Storm email – “…until our meeting is finalised (this afternoon)” ' were clearly not worthy of mention by Mr Narev as these words would have destroyed completely the CBA's manufactured perception.

7) To remove any semblance of reality and make certain that the deception was complete, Mr Narev went into overkill with the words “…because customers were their property.” The Plain Truth has analysed the email in question minutely and is unable detect any of the 5 words Mr Narev claims were in the Storm email let alone finding these same words in the order that Mr Narev presented them to the Committee.

So an innocent and innocuous email requesting the CBA delay phone calls for a couple of hours, has been twisted into a major work of treachery. To the delight of The Plain Truth such lies are so easy to disprove, what is difficult is getting the truth heard and acknowledged. The Plain Truth is committed to presenting reality rather than using bits of reality as the building blocks of major deceptions.

The Plain Truth is urgently in need of volunteer copywriters, proof-readers and investigators. Copy material and lines of investigation will be provided by The Plain Truth. Anyone who is able to assist in any of these areas please contact:

The Editor
The Plain Truth,
PO Box 2783

New Farm QLD 4005


2011.08.15 Letter to CBA board – David Turner (Pt 3)

2008.12.01 e Storm advise to CML to delay calling clients until meeting today

2009.09.04 Sydney – transcript – extract CFS 76

CBA lies under oath to Parliamentary Joint Committee

Wednesday, November 9th, 2011

Report : Ron Burgandy

Wednesday 9th November 2011

The Plain Truth publishes more details from the Commissions letter to CBA Board exposing further CBA lies.

The various points raised in this article are contained in a letter the Commission against Bank Atrocities had sent to the CBA Board on 15 Aug 2008. The Plain Truth has previously published the first 3 pages and annexures and today is making available page 4 and annexures. As previously mentioned The Plain Truth will publish the entire 25 page letter to the CBA Board in time.

…It was Friday 4th September 2009 and somewhere in the world it was a dark and stormy night whilst here in Australia Mr Cohen was being paid by the CBA to give evidence under oath to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Services – Inquiring into Financial Products and Services. One could tell he was lying…… his lips were moving.

In the Parliamentary Joint Committee transcript of 4 Sept 2009, page 81 (CFS 75) – Mr Cohen endeavoured and succeeded in convincing the Committee at that point to shift the blame from where it belonged, squarely on the shoulders of persons known to The Plain Truth within the CBA, onto Storm. He did this with a straight face under oath by blatantly asserting that $600 Million worth of legitimate switch to cash transactions were responses to margin calls which CBA must have issued to Storm. In its 8 October 2008 letter to clients, Storm was planning to prevent margin calls ostensibly to protect investors portfolios.
Clearly Storms letter was not in response to margin calls. Relevant paragraphs extracted from the 8 Oct 08 Storm letter read as follows:-

These paragraphs are unambiguous, as is the entire 8 Oct 08 Storm letter. The Plain Truth is unable to find any statement or draw any inference from this letter that  It was very, very clear that Storm was acting to margin calls' as Mr Cohen was paid to assert.

If CBA contends that they were in fact issuing margin call notices to Storm advisors in 2008 then we challenge anyone to find 1 (one) single notice that was received at any Storm Financial office. The Plain Truth once again exhausted itself in this regard searching for evidence that we have established does not exist in spite of the CBA needing such evidence to exist.

The Plain Truth has been able to obtain copies of margin call notices sent by CGI to non-Storm advisors. An example of such a notice dated 21 Nov 2008 is included for your reference.

Clearly either the CBA appointed receivers have tampered with the Storm database and erased all margin call notices (which does not help their case and therefore seems unlikely) OR…no margin call notices were actually sent to Storm from CBA.

The Plain Truth asks where possible that you please forward to us information or intelligence you may have in your possession regarding the CBA or ASIC. This information will also be shared with the Commission. Copies of information or intelligence should be posted to:

The Editor
The Plain Truth,
PO Box 2783
New Farm QLD 4005

We ask that information provided to The Plain Truth must be evidence and factual in nature. The Plain Truth is NOT INTERESTED IN OPINIONS. Unfortunately to date there have been too many ill-informed opinions flying around getting in the way of the truth and diluting the efforts of the people  actually' trying to make a difference. We need you to volunteer.


Pt 1 of the Commission’s first letter to CBA Board

Pt 2 of the Commission’s first letter to CBA Board

Parliamentary Joint Committee transcript of 4 Sept 2009 – extract CFS 75

2008.10.08 Storm switch letter to clients

2008.11.21 CML margin call notice to non-storm advisor

Documents prove CBA lies

Saturday, November 5th, 2011

Report : Ron Burgandy

Contents : CBA Board of Directors, CBA victims

Saturday 5th November 2011

Commission against Bank Atrocities takes steps to prevent CBA Board from hiding…

On Wednesday night 1st June 2011, four gentlemen and three ladies sat around a table enjoying a quiet drink following a meeting in Townsville attended by a number of people and run by a solicitor from Sydney. Of the 7 people, 5 were former Storm clients and 1 was an accountant and the other a concerned friend. The topic of their discussion was about the enthusiastic presentation at the solicitors meeting and the relative lack of substance. Most of the 7 had attended previous meetings by this same solicitor and although they considered he wasn't a bad style of a bloke and always upbeat, the group had the distinct feeling that the meeting was same ol', same ol'. After a few more drinks the temperature of the conversation rose regarding the CBA, their treatment of former Storm clients and the lack of progress being made by some solicitors in obtaining a FAIR resolution for clients in spite of the solicitors posturing. The evening ended with the 7 agreeing that Slater & Gordon was effectively a subsidiary of the CBA and more interested in their own payday than looking for a fair and equitable outcome for clients. It was also agreed that the ingredient necessary for a  just and equitable outcome' for former Storm clients would only be achieved if the CBA's wrongful & illegal actions were exposed for all to see. In the haze of a few drinks it all seemed so simple…Let's just out the bastards. The final parting of the evening occurred with the pledge to meet again the following evening.

As promised the night before the magnificent 7 met again and to their surprise, the inebriated ideas of the night before still seemed so simple in spite of the lack of alcohol. The cry again went up…Let's just out the bastards!

From this auspicious beginning the Commission against Bank Atrocities was born with the mandate to ensure that where the CBA had done wrong, it will put right according to the Commission and not just according to Mr Norris' definition which if fully expanded is likely to read according to a Commission spokesman ' “Where we have done wrong against our profits, we will put right…and where we have done wrong against others, we will hide it and if we can't we will use our financial clout and political muscle to put them through so many hoops that they won't know North from South, Arthur from Martha or Fred from Fiona”.

The Commissions powers have been described to The Plain Truth in the following statement, “The Commission has the power to collect information, investigate matters and where it deems it appropriate recommend prosecutions. Coincidently these are the same powers that all Australians have courtesy of the ANZAC's having fought for those powers”.


The following brief history has been provided to The Plain Truth by a spokesperson from the Commission.

From the 2nd June 2011 the Commission set about collecting information and investigating matters relating to CBA and its activity against Storm clients and Storm. By the 15th Aug 2011 the Commission had grown to in excess of 45 individuals and had collected and analysed a large amount of information. The Commission in its investigations saw no evidence that the CBA board of directors (with the exception of Mr Norris) had any knowledge of the facts relating to CBA's misconduct towards former Storm clients. This lack of evidence is not proof that the CBA board had no knowledge, however a member of any board can not be held accountable if they in fact did not possess the relevant knowledge, or they did possess the knowledge but it can not be proved. It is one thing for the Commission to believe that the board members possessed the requisite knowledge and another to prove that they did. Accordingly as its first official step the Commission wishes to ensure that the CBA board has the facts and the knowledge of the actions of the company the board is directing. Once the board possesses this knowledge it is only then a small step to accountability.

On the 15th August 2011 the Commission addressed a 25 page letter to each of the members of CBA's board outlining various damning facts. The Plain Truth has obtained a copy of this document directly from the Commission and will today release the first 3 pages of the letter together with the relevant annexures on our website. The Plain Truth has spoken with the client concerned in the letter and verified its content.

What is amazing to The Plain Truth is that a small group of amateurs have been able to amass more information and evidence than The Plain Truth has seen published from ASIC, the Parliamentary Inquiry and a whole bunch of lawyers combined. This lack of evidence coming from ASIC and the Parliamentary Inquiry can only be due to keystone cop ineptitude or a more sinister desire to bury the truth. The Plain Truth, after having seen a mountain of evidence, believes it to be a bit of both but sadly much more the latter than the former.

The Plain Truth acknowledges and applauds the efforts of a few who have done so much to advance the cause of so many. The Plain Truth asks that where possible that you please forward to us information or intelligence that you may have in your possession regarding the CBA or ASIC. This information will also be shared with the Commission. Copies of information or intelligence should be posted to:

The Editor
The Plain Truth,
PO Box 2783
New Farm QLD 4005

We ask that information provided to The Plain Truth must be evidence and factual in nature. The Plain Truth is NOT INTERESTED IN OPINIONS. Unfortunately to date there have been too many ill-informed opinions flying around getting in the way of the truth and diluting the efforts of the people  actually' trying to make a difference. We need you to volunteer.


Letter to CBA board – David Turner (Pt 1)

Commonwealth Bank directors snub CBA victims

Wednesday, November 2nd, 2011

Report : Ron Burgandy

Wednesday, 2nd November 2011

Recent attempts by CBA victims to secure a meeting with CBA management and directors was met with resounding silence.

As the state of play currently stands there are hundreds of former Storm clients / CBA victims who are trying to work towards better outcomes with the CBA. These clients fall into a number of categories ' a group represented by a Sydney solicitor, a group represented by a Brisbane solicitor and a large number who are self-represented or represented by their own individual solicitors. Further sub-groups include the many clients that did not have lending products with CBA but who were undoubtedly affected by CBA's actions. An example is the many Macquarie Margin Lending clients. The Plain Truth has received legal advice that although Macquarie has made some mistakes in its treatment of Storm clients, these mistakes fall within the range of normal business activity. It's apparent to The Plain Truth that many negative Storm client positions that have been attributed to the likes of Macquarie, Westpac, NAB and BoQ are a direct consequence of CBA deceptions against Storm. Accordingly The Plain Truth has been advised these non-CBA clients may have a stronger case against the CBA than they do against their own bank.

It has come to our attention that there is an additional group of former Storm clients / CBA victims and others who have emerged, have conducted their own investigations and have decided to take matters into their own hands. Much of the material The Plain Truth has in its possession comes from this group. This group has formed a commission to investigate bank abuse generally and in particular bank abuse by the CBA and is known as the Commission against Bank Atrocities.

On Monday 15 August 2011 this group sent a letter to each of the Directors of the CBA. This letter to which we refer, outlined certain facts to the directors of the CBA and was designed to prevent the directors from pleading ignorance to these facts. The letter was also a plea for help and a request to respond by 26 Aug 2011. The Plain Truth would like to highlight that this timeframe given to the CBA Directors was a lot more generous than was given by the CBA to its victims in Dec 2008 and subsequently.

As at the date of this article some 80 days after the letter 1st letter was sent to the CBA Board and after a follow up letter was sent on the 14th October 2011, The Plain Truth has been advised that no direct response or acknowledgement has been received from any of the board members although a spokesman for the Commission is quoted as saying, “Mr Norris in his usual style did throw some smoke via a meaningless letter from his lawyers to parties not connected with the Commission”. “This silence (from the CBA) was expected and is consistent with the conduct of the leader of the CBA, Mr Ralph Norris.” The Plain Truth was challenged by the Commission to uncover even 1 former Storm client, Storm executive or Storm staff member to whom Norris has spoken to directly in spite of being requested to do so on numerous occasions. None was found. The Plain Truth has also been informed that a Storm client action group had requested a meeting with Mr Norris but was rebuffed as was the former CEO of Storm Financial, Mr Emmanuel Cassimatis, who had on more than one occasion formally requested a direct meeting with Mr Norris. It remains a great disappointment to all CBA's victims to observe that whilst Mr Norris continues to hide and refuses to engage directly, he seems to relish every opportunity to travel his well-worn path, paved with advertising dollars, to the media.

The Plain Truth intends to release the following as soon as the damning evidence contained has been verified by our experts and the Commission gives its approval:-

– The letter from the Commission to the CBA dated 15th August 2011 highlighting numerous CBA untruths and errors. This will be released in sections.

– The late response by CBA to the Commission's letter dated 15th Aug 11. This response was sent to an unrelated party through lawyers briefed by Mr Norris and dated 15th September 2011.

– The Commissions follow up letter to the CBA Board dated 14th October 2011.

– Additional Commission correspondence dated 19th October 2011 regarding Mr Norris' bonuses and entitlements.

CBA Board of Directors

Should anyone wish to correspond with the board (politely) please use the following address:


[Board Member's name]
Commonwealth Bank Board of Directors
c/- CBA Company Secretary

Ground Floor, Tower 1,
201 Sussex Street,
Email: [firstname.surname]